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The interchange over the details of accelerated depreciation offers a useful backdrop
against which to consider a more general issue: the intellectual coherence of the tax expenditure budgets. The larger concept of tax expenditures was what motivated Kahn to
examine the "normalcy" of accelerated depreciation 13 years ago. And, to our eyes at
least, the issues raised by the concept are no less interesting today than they were in
1979.
The various tax expenditure budgets prepared in the legislative and executive
branches purport to carry out a straightforward task. They claim to identify those situations in which Congress has departed from the "normative," "normal," or "correct"
tax rule in a way that is equivalent to the appropriation of public funds. Or, as it is
sometimes put, they expose circumstances in which Congress has chosen to subsidize
certain activities indirectly, through the Internal Revenue Code.
Yet, the very statement of the task exposes its Achilles heel. It assumes the existence
of one true, "correct," "normative" rule of federal income taxation that should be
applied to any given transaction. The collection of all such rules stands as a kind of
Platonic Internal Revenue Code, an implicit reprimand to the flawed efforts of our mortal Congress.
We believe that questions of tax policy are more complicated than that. An ideal
Internal Revenue Code makes no more sense than an ideal Environmental Protection
Act or an ideal Penal Code. An income tax stands inside, not outside, the society that
enacts it.
The particular contours of our federal income tax serve to reaffirm public values that
are "normative" in every sense of the word except the one used by advocates of tax expenditure budgets. The disallowance of a deduction for illegal bribes confirms that we
think they are naughty. Similarly, the limitation on losses from wagering transactions
shows that we do not consider them to be an appropriate foundation for a career.
Conversely, the exclusion from income of tort recoveries is an expression of public
compassion. And our refusal to tax people when their neighbors help them move furniture, or (as some have suggested) when they enjoy a few moments of leisure, suggests a
shared sense of a private domain in which even the tax collector will respect people's
right to be left alone.
Experts can help to clarify the implications of one tax policy choice over another.
They can show how one choice favors one particular set of moral, political, or economic commitments over another. They can argue for greater consistency in the way
tensions among such commitments are resolved. They can estimate the differences
in the amount and distribution of revenues that would be collected under different
regimes. But, the ultimate choice must rest with the citizen and got the oracle.

The Choice Among Utopias
Let us describe a series of perspectives that are frequently presented concerning the
ideal nature of an income tax:
(I) For some observers of the tax scene, any tax that alters citizen behavior is terribly
unfortunate. Such observers decry any tax that alters individuals' economic incentives
from what they would have been in a world with no taxes and a perfect marketplace. They
would prefer that the government raise its revenues exclusively by taxing (a) activities
that generate negative externalities, and (b) goods for which the demand is entirely inelastic. Since no income tax can pretend to be nondistortional, such observers view all
income tax as tainted by a kind of "original sin."
(2) Other, more practically minded observers, worry that the taxes that would satisfy
perspective (1) would not generate enough revenues for the government to finance its
current level of operations. They believe that Nicholas Kaldor had it right almost 40
years ago, when he argued that the proper income tax system is what we now call a
consumption tax. Such observers are willing to accept the fact that a consumption tax
biases taxpayers' choice between labor and leisure. They console themselves with the
observation that at least a consumption tax avoids biasing the choice between savings
and current consumption.

(4) An\aolhcr trot coIdnnenbtod objects that a consumption tax that would satisfy
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under perspective (3). It would offend sueh conhentators' ticdons of privacy
to ttm citizens m unrealized asset appreciation and on imputed hicome iram services
or duoab1~goods. Or, at least, it would require a preposterous expenditme of administrative resources in an ultimately futile quest. These observers would prefer that we tax
H a @ - 5 b s income to the extent it is realized through market interactions.
(5) Yet another set of commentators finds fault with even the market-delimited, realization-qualified version of the Haig-Simons approacPi@suggested
by pempec€ive (4).
They believe that sueh an approach unacceptably distorts investor inmntives, leading
them to overconsume and undersave, to indulge in too much leisure and not enough
work, While they are in sympathy with the political vision that would allocate the tax
burden according to accumulating economic power, they favor qualificationsto that
vision whenever the cost to productive incentives appears to jeopardize economic
growth.
(6) Finally, one finds the United States Congress. It apparently believes that even the
approach dictated by perspective (5) would leave the American economy in the wrong
plak Not enough research and development, not enough low-income housing, not
enough money in the hands of working families with children, not enough money in
the hands of churches-and museums, too many renters and not enough homeowners,
etc., etc., etc.
If one is prone to depression, one can view the foregoing list of perspectives from (1)
to (6) as identifying a kind of linear decline. Each is one step further from the Garden
of Eden of distortion-free taxation. We view them differently. We prefer to see each
perspective as emphasizing different elements in a basket of normative values - efficiency (in the neoclassical economic sense), consumption/savings neutrality, privacy,
equity, administrabilits-charity,pragmatism, etc.
What is disturbing about the language of tax expenditures is its tone of moral absolutism. The tax expenditure budget is said to distinguish "normal" tax practice from
that which is deviant. Sometimes it is said to distinguish provisions that ;ae "normative" (?) from those that am (presumably) nonnormative (?!). This language is doubly
confusing. First, it suggests that provisions that fit within the implicit baselide of the
tax expenditure budget are-somehow pure, safe, and good. They should not be changed
because "neutral" principles have blessed them. Conversely, the language suggests
that provisions that fall outside the implicit baseline of the tax expenditure budget (tax
expenditures) are somehow corrupt, dangerous, and evil. They should be changed as
soon as possible to conform with the "neutral" position. lb flirt with them is to call
one's probity into question.
This is, of course, a bit of an overstatement. But, it captures the rhetorical direction
of the tax expenditure budget. And that rhetorical direction is grossly misleading. The
tax expenditure budget's conception of an appropriate tax base has no legitimate claim
to establishing the terms of political debate. It should not immunize provisions of the
code from political discussion, nor should it change the burden of justification for
_
others.
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The Illusion of Value-Free Precision - An Example
The reference point for construction of the tax expenditure budget is a measure of
taxable income that is close to position (4) above, with some variations. That may be
some people's Platonic Internal Revenue Code, but it is obviously not everyone's. The
choice among perspectives is a contestable, contingent, political decision. Thus, while
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Obfuscating the Debate - Another ExampIe
(e

In addition to this central conceptual flaw, tax expenditure budgets b v e ale m&tunate tendency to confuseby inviting an easy equation d "tax e-&&s?'
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And central questions about the appropriate goah hr our American k c o k tax get lost
in the transition.
Consider the additional standard deductions available ta the blind a d to the elderly,
listed as tax expenditures by the Congressiohal Budget Office. How might it be maningful to speak of these deductions as "subsidies"? Surely they do not subsidize behavior
that Congress desires. We may be abk to make ourselves lwk ol&r or younger, but
dates of birth seem immutable. And sadistic though our elected representatives might
be, no one believes they want taxpayers to blind themselves.
No, in this context, the only conceivable way to think of the deductions as sub&!ies
is to emphasize that they show solicitude for a particular category of people - a Eorm
of weIfare expenditure through the Internal Revenue Code, ib be sure, t l ~ esolicitude
example, a
takes the form of a deduction against taxable income rather than that of,
refundable credit against taxes along the lines of t$e Earned Income Bm credit. Thus,
it is more symbolic than financial solicitude in the case of blind snd elderly people who
would have no taxable income even without the extra deductions. But, some would say,
that is precisely the point. The deductions are not only subsidiw but also nasty, upside-down subsidies that benefit the elderly and blind rich but not the elderly and bnd.
poor.
The pro1 rn with this line of argument is that it tempts us to snc& around t h q g h
the back door to reach a conclusion without codkmting the~contestdbkpremises
derlying that conclusion. In this context, the conclusion that the deductions an tu
expenditures might presume that under a "normative" income tax, all taxpayers Mnuld
receive the same "standard deduction." It might be ugdewtaod as a initial YWQ

bracket" in the progressive rate structure. But if that is so, why are not differences in
standard deduction (or in the rate structure itself) based on marital status just as objectionable? Such differences exist in current law, but are not listed in the tax expenditure
budget.
More directly, why isn't any standard deduction for nonitemized expenditures a tax
expenditure? Why isn't the existence of marginal rates below the highest marginal rate
a tax expenditure? What is the logic that protects a progressive rate structure from
being branded nonnormative?
The debate over progressive taxation continues to follow its uneasy course. Among
the defenses that seem to retain substantial support, however, are variants of the
"equal-sacrifice" position - the idea that the burdens of government should exact a
roughly equal sacrifice from each taxpayer. Such defenses turn out to be theoretically
difficult. It is easy to assume that any individual will experience a declining marginal
utility of income, as he or she moves from "necessities" to "luxuries." But, there is no
reason to think that different individuals will see marginal utility decline at the same
rate, or in the same pattern. And at some level, the interpersonal utility comparisons
implicit in the purest conception of "equal sacrifice" become meaningless.
But this defense of progressive taxation is willing to live with a somewhat less pure
concept of "equal sacrifice." It makes the social judgment that rich people can afford
to spare more of their next dollar of income than poor people can. Rather than measuring citizens' personal utility curves, the rate structure can be said to describe a social
judgment about what standardized hypothetical utility curve we are willing to attribute
to citizens for the purpose of allocating the tax burden.
Note something about this logic: it could equally well support arguments in favor of
certain forms of public direct expenditures on behalf of all poor people. Yet that fact
alone is iloi enough to lead tax expenditure budgets to include the low marginal rates
found in a progressive rate structure. We presume that is because one might plausibly
think it especially relevant in the tax context - a reason to lower an individual's tax
burden that might not be powerful enough to warrant the creation of a program of direct public expenditures.
This same logic, however, can also support the special deductions for the blind and
the elderly. Such deductions can be seen as rough adjustments to the standardized hypothetical utility curve - a crude recognition that those who are blind or aged must spend
more to meet their basic needs than young, sighted taxpayers must spend. Moreover,
one might plausibly think such a recognition to be especially relevant in the tax con..
text. A supporter of equal-sacrifice progressivity could plausibly support an adjustment
to the rate schedules of the blind and the elderly without necessarily feeling compelled
to support a direct expenditure program on their behalf.

Conclusion
Tax expenditure budgets divide all tax provisions into categories. One category comprises "pure tax" provisions that appear to serve no "nontax" goals. The deduction
allowed a business for paying a commission to a salesman may be a representative example. The other category comprises "pure subsidy" provisions that seem to serve
only nontax goals. The Earned Income Tax Credit, which subsidizes the wages of lowincome workers with children, may be a representative example. To the extent tax
provisions might arguably serve both tax and nontax goals, the function of the tax
expenditure budget is to decide which set of goals predominates.
Our point is that very few items fit neatly into one category or the other. Virtually all
provisions of the tax laws have elements that some individuals might consider independent of the "core" task of measuring a particular concept of "income." On the other
hand, since any income tax, no matter how defined, will influence citizen behavior, it
would be a strange tax system that pretended to ignore those effects. Those effects are
properly important considerations in determining which conception of income we
would like to use.
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We think democratic debate would be promoted if we knew how much additional
revenue could be gained by repealing each of the code provisions shown in the various
tax expenditure budgets. as well as who would bear the incidence of that additional revenue. We think democratic debate would also be promoted in precisely the same way.
however. if we knew how much additional revenue could be gained through a host of
changes to provisions that are not shown on the tax expenditure budgets. Most tax provisions. like most policy -judgments. are good only as long as their price tags are not
exorbitant. Here again, the tax expenditure budget hides that fact by suggesting that
certain features of the tax system are different in kind from others.
More generally. our critical view of tax expenditure budgets is pragmatic, not nihilistic. We do not believe that all arguments are equally good. or equally persuasive.
Indeed. the two of us often disagree between ourselves about whether a particular argument is persuasive or not. But we both believe strongly that the need to evaluate such
arguments on their ("normative") merits cannot be obviated by talismanic reference to
an "expert" understanding of one particularized vision of the "normal" or "ideal" tax
base.
We find it valuable to point out those provisions of the code that depart from what
one would expect to find if one's sole concern were measuring accumulations of wealth
during a taxable year. We also find it valuable to point out the different conceptions of
"consumption" that might underlie arguments for or against the allowance of a particular deduction. But in precisely the same way, we find it valuable to point out the
different conceptions of "privacy" or "family" or "charity" that might underlie arguments for or against other provisions of the code. Our tau laws respond to fundamental
questions about what values matter to us as a society. The tax expenditure budget presumes that some of us should be deemed to know the answers better than others.
Consider the question, "Should the National Zoo house panda bears?" If one were to
hold a public hearing on the matter, one could expect to hear a range of interesting arguments presented by citizens interested in issues ranging from urban planning to animal
rights, from budgetary policy to biological diversity. Yet. consider how you would react to a person who offered the following testimony:
1 am from the American Society of Zookeeping Experts. In my expert
opinion. and in the opinion of my fellow experts. 'normative zoos' are. by
definition, zoos that house no animals other than bears(!). Following the traditions of my discipline. I have accordingly engaged in substantial research into
the question whether panda bears are truly bears or merely raccoons. 1 report
to you today that they are raccoons. Accordingly, 1 have placed panda bears on
the Roster of Prohibited Animals.
Tax experts, like zookeeping experts, are important members of American society.
Their ideas should figure prominently in debates over national tax policy. The question
for us is whether tax expenditure budgets grounded in a contestable vision of tax policy
are ultimately any more valuable to such debate than a Roster of Prohibited Animals
grounded in an idiosyncratic vision of zookeeping.
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